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The primary question of vital importance of our time is the problem 
of the war and peace. Under the shadow of the threatening weapons of mass 
extermination the further existence of the mankind is already at stake there­
fore the question of war and peace is not any more “primus inter pares” 
but, as f o r  its significance, it outdoes considerably the other anxieties of 
the mankind. rl herefore, it may not be considered a mere hance that nearly 
all responsible ideological and political tendencies deal intensively with the 
problem of the peace and war. The position taken up in the case of peace 
necessarily involves the analysis of the values the fulfilment and realiza­
tion of which improve the prospects of the maintenance of peace. Among 
them, first of all the justness, expecially the social justness can be placed.
The valuation of the peace and the justness can keep apart from each, 
other for social historical reasons and the judgement of the possible diver­
gencies holds theoretically several problems and numeous possibilities of 
disputes in store. The justness is namely a category of several meanings, 
of several senses which may appear not only as social justness but also&as 
connected to the peace and, to the contrast thereof, to the war, too. In this 
relation, however, not only the just peace as fundamental value shall be 
spoken of, set against the unjust war, but also the questions raised by the 
just war and the unjust peace shall be reckoned with.
Because, however, since the accomplishment and the development on a 
larger and larger scale of nuclear weapons the question of the war and peace 
has become the primary problem of vital importance of the mankind, the 
question is brought up by right whether the peace has not become a value 
of such character which cannot be confined to the second place in whatever 
collision of values. In other words whether the just war -  traditionally 
expressed iustum helium’ — has not become senseless because the grounds 
of the war exterminating the mankind cannot be substantiated by whatever 
justness.
In the literature of the recent years the number of works dealing with 
the possibility, and impossibility, respectively, of the just war has increased, 
d he majority of these works challanges the possibility of the just war with 
reference to the dangers of the man-destroying war causing amoralism. 
This attitude is represented by M. Walzer in his work entitled Gibl es denn 
gerechten Krieg? (Suttgart, 1982). The same suggestion is to be found in the
work entitled The Just War of R. Tucker (Baltimore, 1060), with the dif­
ference, however, that Tucker sympathizing with the Marxism gives utter­
ance first of all to his doubt in that respect whether the conceptions based on 
the strategy of determent, tending towards the preventive war of the Ame- 
tican leading circles can be considered just. On the other hand, 1*. Ramsey 
in Iris work entitled The Just War (New York, 1968) argues with the work 
Bellum contra helium iustmn of R. Tucker (p. 391) and advocates the “just” 
war based on the determent.1
Further on, I should like to find an answer to the question how many 
veracity is to be found in the statement according to which the war and 
the justness have become nowadays concepts incompatible with each 
other.
To give an answer on the merits to this complex question difficult to 
be responded, it seems to be necessary to give a historical survey in the 
course of which it should be investigated, on the one hand, how did develop 
and what kind of significant changes did the concept and ideology of the 
just and unjust wars undergo and, on the other hand, which trend of deve­
lopment. evolved from the almost undifferentiated affirmation of the war up 
to the complete prohibition of war between the states, in the framework of 
this essay it is not possibly eventto touch upon the significant components 
of this intricate complex of problems, thus e. g. I cannot deal in detail with 
the fundamental question either, what kinds of transformation have occur­
red in the sphere of the reasons of wars.
It may seem perhaps unusual that I deal circumstantially with the 
evolution of the international laic in connection with the war. The reason 
thereof is implied in that although in general the law reflects only and lays 
down primarily the economic-social relations, it occurs exceptionally that 
it precedes permanently them. This is the case with the international law, 
several attitudes of which have comprised from the second half of the 19th 
century until our days norms containing humanistic “Sollens” embodying 
the wishes of wide social strata and drawn up in legal form and, thus, the 
law has constituted the organic part of the development of fundamental 
opinions on the just and unjust wars.
The evolution of the international law has to be taken into considera­
tion just therefore, too, because the Marxist attitude on the peace and war 
has to show due regard also for the notion of the international law and as 
far as it is possible, it has to be in conformity with that. The ideology, the 
valuation of wars date back to nearly as old ages as the wars themselves. 
The men participating in the war by order or voluntarily, under obligation 
or for money risk their life, they kill and are killed, therefore they are not 
indifferent -  and the peaceful inhabitants are neither -  to the question 
why do all these happen. In spite of this fact, that wars appeared as normal 
phenomena resulting from the existence of the different countries just with 
the Greeks and Romans, the moral distinction of the characters of wars 
was still lacking in these ages. The war was a special "value , with the 
Greeks, Achille as a bellicose man was a kind of ideal and also the Romans 
highly appreciated the psychical and physical virtues related to the war.
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According to László Gajzágó “The war has domination over the Greeks and 
not they over the war” (László Gajzágó: Law of war and peace, Budapest, 
1942, pp. 10-11).
With the Romans, at most such a distinction was made that the war 
was just in case if it was preceded by the declaration of war (for want thereof 
it was unjust). They insisted on and ensured the protection of the legates 
and the maintenance of the cessation of hostilities. The obligation to bury 
the dead presented itself as a moral element. (As a matter of fact, the Gre­
eks attached also great value to the burial of the dead.)
A fundamental change was brought about by the birth of the Christi­
anity. The war was from the very beginning a difficult problem not fully 
solvable and solved for the Christians. The ideology of the early Christianity 
was essentially an unambiguously anti-war attitude, the war was incompa­
tible with the principle of the love and the freedom from violance. Accor­
ding to Orígenes “Do not take up arms against any nation, as men of peace, 
follow Jesus” (Cited by Tibor Somlyói Tóth in his article entitled “Celestial 
peace, earthly war”, Világosság, 1984/2, p. 298).
The social, economic and political motives of the wars did not hold 
off even after the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. Following the 
turn of Constantine, with the becoming the state religion of the Christianity, 
it became necessary for the theologians to appraise more tingedly the wars 
initiated by the Christian sovereigns or those enforced upon them as well 
as the necessity of the participation therein. The Christianity had to include 
the war in the divine order of universe, making somehow or other consistent 
the omnipotence, sapience and charity of God with the wars, while it had 
to delimite itself from the negative features of wars: from the homicide, 
the hate, the ravage, being unambiguously inconsistent with the fundamen­
tal principles of Christianity.
Consequently — may it say however inconsistent — the idea appeared 
in the antique Christianity that the war was not an evil, as well as the 
contrary of this idea did so: a fundamental difference had been made bet­
ween the wars according to their justness and unjustness.
Augustine wrote about the first mentioned idea that “God could not 
order sinful things therefore the war could not be injurious either”. If the 
war results in a progress it should be considered a divine donation, if, ho­
wever, it brings about a ruin, thus, it is part of the divine destiny.
On the other hand — and this is an essential advance in the history 
of the estimation of war — the Christianity endeavoured to condemn un­
ambiguously somckinds of wars. As it was stated by István Herczeg “In the 
Christianity the war was not any more a natural phenomenon but some 
kinds thereof have to be eliminated”.) (István] Herczeg: Prohibition of the 
offensive wars and the definition of aggression, Budapest, 1964, p. 10). Alre­
ady the bishop Ambrose preached that “the force without justice feeds 
only the evil” and Agostine stated unambiguously: “No state exists wit­
hout justness. If the empires are not hased on justness, they are at most 
“latrocina (gangs of crooks)” (Agostine, De civilate Dei, Jena, 1924).
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The elaboration of the conception making difference between just 
and unjust wars holds on from Agostine through Gratian and A. Halensis 
up to Thomas Aquinas. The foundation in principle of the just war is based 
on the idea that in so far as an unjustness, grievance or a prejudice to 
interests befall a state than, for the sake of the protection of justness, the 
injured legal order shall be restored. Therefore, in this case, in the interest 
of the enforcement of justness regarded as the main virtue by the Christians, 
other values are subordinated which are infringed as a matter of course 
by the war. According to László Gajzágó “one of the flower shoots of the 
Christinaty, the chivalrousness teaches that in such cases the princes are 
not only permitted but they are obliged to make war” (Since no human 
power is above them which would effect the legal remedy on their behalf 
and for them).
According to Thomas Aquinas the simultaneous existence of three 
conditions is necessary for the war being just.
a) “iusta causa" i. e. the repelling of unjust action of the enemy, and 
in this sanse the war is some kind of the international purative administra­
tion of justice;
b) "autoritás princijnis” i. e. only a sovereign monarch that is a state 
can make or wage a just war and finally,
a) ‘‘intenlio recta” i. e. good intent is necessary, no revengefulness 
must press the party making or waging a war (Cited by István Herczeg, 
op. cit.).
The Christianity could hardly tackle the contradiction between the 
arbitrariness of rear and the justness. One of the fundamental justness prin­
ciples of the Roman law, “Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa” (No­
body must be judge in his own case) state unambiguously that the taking 
the justice into one’s own hands is to a certain extent inevitably arbit­
rary due to the interest of the injured party, therefore it cannot be just. 
The war is, however, a characteristic form of the self-constituted court 
and the stipulation of Thomas Aquinas according to which no individual 
person or small group but only a sovereing monarch must make war, is 
only a modest help. Although this restriction means a delimitation from 
the anarchical fist-law, such problems whether the value judgement on 
the justness of war is reliable if the interested party establishes the justness 
and the applied means, are unanswered further on. The Aristotelian prin­
ciple of proportionality aims at the reduction of arbitrariness, according 
to which the war is in so far just as it is proportionate to the caused grie­
vance, the definition thereof depended, however, similarly on the injured 
party.
The reduction of unjustnesses within the justness is served by the 
argumentation that the war, similarly to the duel widely popular in that 
time, is actually the judgement of the (just) God.2 In this case, however, 
it was difficult to justify why the princes making a just war often suc- 
combed.
All these, however, did not make a change in that even the “just” 
war contained several further unjustness for the defeated party. Thus e. g.
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all properties of the defeated devolved upon the conqueror, the booty 
was considered rightful, during the war not only the men but also the 
women and children (!) were permitted to be killed, only the violation of 
women was considered a wrongfulness.
A further restriction was that the distinction between the just and 
unjust wars was valid only in respeef of battles fought by the Christian 
princes against each other, against the unbelievers, however, the war was 
just. The principle of “Fides non est habenda cum infidelibus” (Faith — here: 
faithfulness — does not pertain to faithless people” was applied e.g. in 
the holy ways. This was in close connection with the fact that the enemies 
advocated the seme principles. Thus e.g. according to the Coran, only an 
armistice but no peace-treaty might be concluded with the nonbelievers 
(giaours).
The Christianity deserves credit for its trying to teko measures for 
the mitigation of the cruelty of war and in this respect it became the forerunner 
of the “later socalled humanitarian law”. First of all the so-called “treuga 
dei” belonged among these measures according to which on certain days 
(primarily on feast-days) it was prohibited to wage a war and the churches 
were considered in principle sanctuaries. Moreover, the pope in powerhad 
the right to excommunicate the princes initiating unjust war.
Several ways similarly full of unforeseeable difficulties presetted 
themselves for the elimanition of the collisions of values resulting from the 
valuation of a part of wars as just, justifiable ones, as a consequence of 
which priority was given to the values of these wars over other funda­
mental Christian values.
One solution was the elimination of the collision of values at the expense 
of qualifying no kind of wars in the future as — relatively — valuable but 
declaring the general prohibition of war in order to ensure the “free road” for 
the principle of love. In the course of the history such attempts and concep­
tions appeared repeatedly. The decree of Emperor Maximilian I of 1495 
was one of those requiring “Ewiger Landsfried” i.e. everlasting peace from 
the princes of the German empire. The law thereon provided, however, by 
no means a real of general validity since it was qualified only for the limi- 
nation of wars, dissensions within the German empire — let us add — wit­
hout any success. The famous ideas of Kant on the “everlasting peace” 
may be classed here. Kant regarded the peace built up on the selfish inclina­
tions of people, utilizing the mutual economic advantages of the trade 
as the solution of the future. Kant was not, however, an Utopist, he was 
aware of the war being at present still inevitable, in relation to the negative 
features of the human race.
In this respect Kant represents a transition to the other, more realistic 
idea which takes rightfully into consideration that the wars cannot be 
— at least for the moment — eliminated, therefore it tries to reduce the 
collisions by the means of law, more precisely, of the international law.3
The international law itself is the product of the early bourgeois 
evolution in the course of which national states came successively into 
existence. The conception of “one state — one empire” was relegated to
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the background, and the regulation in the spirit of the international law 
of the relations of states coming into extence and getting stronger became 
more and more necessary. The evolving international law regarded from 
the very first the regulation of the law of peace as one of its fundamental 
problems wherein the endeavour came across that the judgement of proce­
dures, conducts permissible during the warfare must not be left to the
-  essentially arbitrary — vale judgement of the belligerent parties, and 
of the princes, respectively, but the — in principle — more exact norms of 
the law' should be applied.4
It cannot be regarded as a mere chance that Hugo Grotius counted
— according to a great many people -  to be the founder of the inter­
national law', wrote a work of three volumes on the “Law of w'ar and peace” 
in which he tried to define with an exceptional preeisity when could a war be 
considered just, and what is, respectively, permissible and forbidden in the 
war. He stated that the war had extremely manifold reasons. “So many 
sources the judicial action has. so many sources the war has,” Grotius, 
just like the other famous international jurist, De Vittoria, tries to define 
more exactly what types of grievances may occasion to wage a just w'ar. 
According to Grotius “No w ar must be made on account of whatever 
crime”. De Vittoria still writes in Iris work entitled “De jure belli” that 
“Not all sorts and all degrees of grievances are sufficient for making war” 
(cited by Géza Herezeg in his work entitled “Evolution and present problems 
of the humanitarian international law” Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, Buda­
pest, 1981, p. 212).
The international law has, however, particularities due to which its 
legal natura has been repeatedly queried 3up to the present day. While 
namely the “internal” law regulating the relations of the subjects of a 
state can be enforced by the state, no such external compulsive pow'er 
exists — aside from a few exceptions — in case of the international law. 
Therefore, the question is often raised whether a norm system having 
unenforceable postulata may be regarded actually as a law. Consequently, 
the international law' has been considered — at least in the early period 
of its development — essentially the collection of natural-law principles 
since the enforcement of its principles has depended — directly — just 
on the attitude of the interested states. If we add moreover that the establish­
ment and development of the international law are closely connected with 
the consolidation of another historical phenomenon, namely of the evolution 
of the state suvereigniy being in several respects a factor reacting against 
the international law, it becomes obvious that the restriction of the unjust­
ness of w'ars by means of the international law comes up against extremely 
serious obstacles seeming insurmountable.5
Hence, it follows that famous “classic” international jurists, such as 
Pufendorf and Vattel are compelled to state that the w'ar is the situation 
where the national can enforce its rights. This means that in the conflict 
of the sovereignty and peace, the peace is necessarily and repeatedly over­
matched. Therefore — unfortunately — the international jurist is right 
who states that up to the middle of the 20th century “the unrestricted right
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to war was the inseparable constituent of the state sovereignty” Herczeg, op. 
cit., p. 13; author’s italics). This means that for certain sovereign states, 
the enforcement of their real or presumptive rights by unjust wars as well 
is much more important than the observation of natural-law principles 
relating to the peace and to the just war of the international law.
As a consequence of all these, the parties fought their wars — on both 
sides — in the spirit of the justness presumed by them. The aggressor was 
convinced that he repelled a grievance, whereas the attacked party professed 
the justness of the defence. The sometimes doubtful coupling of the justness 
with the war results in that the justness loses one of its original human 
functions, its role of intensifying the confidence of human relations, of 
people in each other and becomes dehumanized. The slogan “Fiat justilia, 
pereal mundus” (be — i.e. triumph -  the justness, even if the world would 
get lost) originates the enforcement of w hich may result in endless, nearly 
interminable wars implying immense suffering and grief.6
In the history of the views relating to the just war the French revolution 
represented a further step, among the declared principles of which not 
only general human rights appeared but also democratic, humanistic norms 
concerning the relations to each other of nations and states were present. 
The declaration of the equality of states falls under them which, due to its 
essence, was favourable for the smaller states as against the considerably 
stronger great powers and served for the legal elimination of their inequality. 
A still more significant principle of justness is the declaration of the obli­
gation to “non-intervention” (as a complementary principle of the state 
sovereignty). Accordingly, it is prohibited and unjust to interfere in the 
home affairs of another state, and this principle may be actually regarded
— impliedly — as a pre-idea of the prohibition of war.
The evolution of the 19th century, the colonization, the establishment 
of the imperialism did not encourage, of course, the endeavours which 
tried to avert at leat the outbreak of unjust wars by international legal 
means. The unrestricted right to launch war has been ranked further on
— implicitly — as an institution generally accepted by the international 
law.
Although the estimation of the question did not alter basically from 
the point of view of the international law, the problem practically worsened 
and, parallel to the development of the technology, to the development of 
the weapons of mass destruction, the burdens of wars, the grieves caused 
by them wrere multiplied. The evolution occurred not in the field of the 
“ius ad bellum” (right to launch war) but in the sphere of “ius in bello” 
(law applied in the war).7
The so-called “humanitarian international law” has asserted itself 
more powerfully at the first time from the second half of the 19th century. 
The principal endeavour of its representatives was to elaborate inter­
nationally accepted rules as a consequence of which the anti-humanistic 
and unjust features of the wars already broken out could be mitigated. 
The humanitarian international law, while accepting the fact that the aim 
of the war was the defeat of the enemy, has wanted to formulate norms
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with the observation of which certain inhuminities and unjustnesses not 
necessarily incidental to this aim could be ubviated.
The humanitarian international lav.' has been realized in the so-called 
Geneva conventions with the further development of which the United 
Nations Organization has dealt on several occasions. Plans have been 
elaborated for the regulation of the treatment of the prisoners of war, of 
the wounded and diseased, starting from the principle that it would be 
unjust to treat them just like the soldiers able to riglit Moreover, it was 
declared in the spirit of the same that the principle “nobody must survive 
in the battle, no prisoner of war must be taken” was unacceptable. The 
further development and application of the weapons of mass destruction 
have begun to make gradually indistinct the dividing lines between the 
soldiers and the civilian population. The followers of the humanitarian 
international law have therefore strived after the elaboration of rules 
providing for the protection as intensive as possible of the civilian population 
in case of war conflicts.
A highly important endeavour is in this field the effort to restrict the 
weapons of mass destruction causing greater damages than the average. 
The prohibition of the chemical weapons belongs e.g. here.
A significant moment was in the development of the humanitarian 
international law the establishment and application of the concept of 
war-criminal in the international law after the Second World War.8
The provisions of the international lawr to be applied were not only of 
humanitarian character but the majority of them contained simultaneously 
considerable justness moments. Thus, the conception is obviously just that 
the civilian population deserves a different treatment in the war than the 
opposed armed military forces. (The killing of these latters in battle falls 
under a different moral judgement than that of the defencelless civilian 
population.9
A similarly fundamental principle of the justness comes across in that 
the committers of criminal acts are called to account not only in case of 
having committed “civil” crimes but also in such cases if crimes of war 
character rests upon them. According to the salty remarks of H. Bernstein: 
“It is not any more an excuse for the criminal if killed not one but two 
persons, these two, however, in millions” (H. Bernstein, Final Judgement, 
London, 1947, p. 22). After the w'ar criminals having been called to account, 
the committers of such acts have to reckon in the future with the fact that 
the war character of their activity does not mean an excuse for them.
The legal regulation of the above outlined subject matters — compri­
sing only some main fields of the humanitarian international law — resulted 
in considerable disputes. At the same time, the enforcement of the norms in 
the practice was highly restricted. Thus e.g. in the trials of the Nazi war- 
criminals the Nuremberg Tribunal stated that the leaders of different level 
of the Nazi Germany had violated in the Second World War in great masses 
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions signed also by Germany. (By the 
w ay, this fact served as legal basis for the calling to account since the laws
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of the fascist Germany did not qualify several acts laid to the charge of 
the accused as criminal act.)
The evolution of the international law was not confined, however, 
to the further development of the rules of “ius in hello” in respect of the 
war, but endeavours have been made and continually strengthened which 
have opposed the principle of the unrestricted war authority of states. In this 
respect two phases of development may be distinguished. The first one 
beginning with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 was characterized 
in that it wanted to restrict the unlimited war authority and tried to make 
preliminary conditions of the right to unleash a war. Hence, in this period 
the starting a war was not yet considered unjust from the verj' first, certain 
forms thereof met, however, with the reprobation of the international law. 
Thus e.g. the Hague Conventions obliged the signatory states to settle 
their conflicts through “goodwill” and court of arbitration — and only 
in case of the failure of these steps they were entitled to start a war.
The League of Nations pursued this direction. Numerous anti-war 
conventions were originated from among which the most important one 
was the so-called Brian-Kcllog Pact of 1928 which was the first in the 
history which interdicted the war as the instrument of the pursuance of 
policy. The 60 states including almost the entire community of the sovereign 
international states of that time renounced the right to start a war. The 
consequent attitude of the Soviet Union beginning with the peace pact of 
1917 perceptibly influenced this development. Unfortunately, the Brian- 
Kellog Pact (together with other arrangements) produced no effect and the 
Second World War proved unambiguously that the means of the inter­
national law were not efficacious enough with respect to the aggressive 
imperialist ambitions.
After the Second World War, the framing of the United Nations 
Charter induced the further development, though provisionally in a legal 
way and legal respect only. The Atlantic Charter adopted by the Allies in 
August 1941 laid already down that “All nations of the world have to 
come to abandon the recourse to violance”.
The United Nations Charter relies on two essential principles in the 
question of war, according to the first point of the first Article of first 
Chapter: “The conflicts must be settled under the principles of justness 
and of the international late” (author’s italics).
The most significant change was brought about, however, by that 
the UNO unambiguously declared the prohibition of war, moreover, pro­
hibited all kinds of violance as well as the threats of violance among the 
states. “The United Nations Charted definitelj’ closes the period of which 
the war was a normal legal institution” — writes István Herczeg (op. cit.
p. 62).
An essential fact is that UNO was not contented with the declaration 
of the disapproval of war but has established an international organ (the 
Security Council) which has been obliged to restore the peace by applying 
international forces. The striving after the accurate definition of the aggres­
sion is an organic consequence of the anti-war fundamental norms of UNO.
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After long-lasting discussion, the general assembly of 1974 adopted a reso­
lution on the definition of the aggression. Both the question of the aggres­
sion and the definition of the war were much debated (it was not a mere 
chance either that due to the ambiguity of the concept of the war the 
expression “armed conflict” has been applied since 1949).
As a consequence of all these, a fundamental legal change has been 
brought about in the position of states participating in the war. “In the 
past, the legal position of states fighting with each other was identical, the 
attitude of the aggressor was only morally or politically differently judged 
than that of the attacked party since the states had the right to resort to 
armed violance in order to settle the cases at issue . . .  After the abolishment 
of the right of states to start a war the act of the aggressor became an inter­
national delict and the state attacked by force of arms got in the state of justi­
fiable defence”.
Although, according to UNO, the prohibition of war of the states 
is absolute, the enforcement of this regulation renders inevitably justified 
the military measures required for the restoration of peace. Therefore, 
the self-defence against the aggression further on (but only until the arrange­
ments of the Security Council) and the armed intervention of the community 
of states by reason of the resolution of Security Council against the aggression 
are equally justifiable.
The prohibition of UNO relates, however, only to the military conflicts 
between the states. Point 7 of the second clause of the United Nations Charter 
prohibits the intervention of UNO in such cases which “belong essentially 
to the internal jurisdiction of a state”. The resolution of 1974 defining the 
aggression lays down that the definition encroaches by no means the 
rights to the self-determination, liberty and independence of the states. 
This is closely connected with the conception that the wars of liberation must 
not be considered aggression which means at the same time that their favouring 
from outside cannot be qualified as of such character either.
Unfortunately, the effective international situation falls considerably 
behind the positive and foreshadowing character of the development of 
the international law. In spite of the resolutions of UNO several wars broke 
out between states and UNO did not succeeded its efficient measures 
in forcing the parties participating in the war to stop immediately the war. 
A characteristic example thereof is the war between Iraq and Iran going 
for some years and causing considerable casualties. The responsibility of 
the Great Powers — permanent members of the Security Council — is highly 
significant for making immediate decisions in case of each war broken aut 
between the states for stopping this war and for enforcing these measures 
with the assistance of the Great Powers.
Let us investigate now (in the light of all those said above) how the 
altitude of the Marxism has worked out in the question of the justness of tear. 
As for the justness, the classics of Marxism dealt little with the question 
of justness for historical reasons and they criticized especially the opinions 
which wanted to build up the necessity of the socialism — raising moral 
standards — on the “eternal” justness.10
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Some change occurred with Lenin who dealt more thoroughly with the 
problem of the justness of war. His work comprehended the periods of the 
preparation, the outbreak and issue of the First World War when the 
fundamental question was propounded whether the war could be prevented, 
and after its outbreak, how could it be finished, respectively, in accordance 
with the interests of the labour movement.
In the judgement of the war, Lenin joined primarily to the humanist 
trend of the history of ideas which reprehended the war as an anti-human 
institution. “The socialists have always disapproved of the war between 
people as of a barbarous, brutal thing.” (Lenin: On the war, the army and 
the military science, Budapest, 1978, p. 556).
In conformity therewith, Lenin strived after the prevention of war 
by the labour movement and reprehended those social democrats who voted 
the military budget of their own country.
At the same time, Lenin held that the tears were the special products 
of the class-societies which were closely connected with the home policy 
of the individual countries, with the activity of the classes. He agreed with 
Clausewitz according to whom “the war is the pursuance of the policy 
by other means”. In this sence Lenin extended the notion of the war and 
regarded not only the armed conflicts between the states but also the 
national wars of liberation and the civil wars as wars. On this basis he 
distinguished between the w'ars by tsking into consideration “which were 
the reasons of the war, what the aims of the participants and which classes 
waged the war”. (Lenin, op. cit. p. 775).
There are just wars the purpose of wrhich is the liberation of the 
oppressed people, and nations, respectively, and the social progress. “The 
history knows several wars which, in spite of the inevitably associated 
horrors, brutal atrocities, calamities and misery, were of progressive cha­
racter and promoted the development of the mankind . . . ” (Lenin, op. cit. 
p. 556). On the other hand — according to the sense — the wars of conquest, 
acquiring new territories, the imperialist wars are unjust.
Finally, one of his main ideas in connection with the war is that only 
the socialist revolution can relieve the mankind for ever of the war, the wars 
can come definitely to the end only by the w'orld-wide victory of the soci­
alism.
Since the laying down of Lenin’s ideas nearly seventy years passed and 
fundamental historical changes occurred in the world and in the judgement 
of the question of war and peace. These changes are indicated not only by 
the establishment of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and, 
togethes therewith, the further development of the Marxism, the trans­
formation of the capitalism, the Second World War, but simultaneously 
by the danger of a world war threatening the existence of the mankind, and 
at the same time by such political and international legal efforts which 
have proclaimed the war outlawry. The question is rightly raised how does 
the Marxism react at present theoretically upon the problem of the relation 
of war and peace as well as of the justness ?
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These questions are extremely difficultly answered, among others 
because this range of problems is influenced not only by theoretical but by 
fundamental political considerations. Therefore, I  should like to outline 
further on — schematically — a possible Marxist answer. In my book 
published last year I attempted to elaborate a possible Marxist conception 
of justness, in the forthcoming I shall try to give an answer in the spirit 
of this conception to the raised questions.11
The brief, concise and therefore somewhat simplified essence of the 
above outlined conception consists in thet the society must be considered 
just which ensures equally for all people what is due them by right of their 
being a man: pulling forth of their human essence, of their abilities to the 
largest possible extent. Since, however, so far no social-ecconomic formation 
has reached this stage of development, this principle of justness can be 
rendered operative only if the everyday use of the expression “justness” 
is overstepped which applies these expression generally as poles as under 
(•‘something is either just or unjust”). A many-graded scale is applied with 
which not only the justness placed on one pole, but also all the grades 
constitute a value each which are more just than other grades being more 
unjust as compared therewith. This hypothesis has the consequence, too, 
that even the social (similarly as the individual related thereto) justness 
appears scarcely distinctly; the overwhelming majority of the phenomena is 
complex: it contains — though in different proportions — equally just and 
unjust elements. In this conception the justness and the social progress are 
though in close connection but do not coinckde at all automatically with 
each other: due to the contradictory nature, the social progress has phases 
which mean a progress as compared to the previous age, though they 
involve major unjustnesses. (Thus e.g. the development of various ancient 
forms of the slavery is generally a part of the social progress, at the same 
time, it brought about much more unjust social relations than the previous 
era.)
An important element of the conception is further on that however 
much the justness may be an important value in the life of a society, it 
may not be considered the top value standing on the peak of the hierarchy 
of values (as was presumed by numerous people from Aristotle up to Raids), 
therefore in case of the collision of justness with other values, it has to 
be concretely pondered to which of them and to what extent preference 
should be given. If this conception is intended to be applied to the present 
problems of war and peace, the universal peace and the woi ld war shall be 
regarded as the co-ordinates determining everything else. Since, however, 
a possible world war would cause — according to the almost generally 
accepted notion — the perdition of the mankind, accompanied evidently 
by the destruction of all values, we have to accept as an axiom that such 
a war cannot be just from the very first, be as it may the purpose of its starters. 
Consequently, in this collision of values the peace becomes inevitably domi­
nant, namely to such an extent that thereby the justness moments of a 
possible thermonuclear war are completely eliminated.
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This axiom leaves at the same time its mark on all possible so-called 
local wars of our time. In my opinion, one of the fundamental characteristics 
of our age is that under the shadow of the danger of the tliird world war the 
nature of no (local) tear of smaller or larger volume can be satisfactorily 
judged by istclf without investigating: what effect will the given war have 
on the universal peace. Consequently, the nature of the war cannot be any 
more determined on the strength of the intentions, aims of the bellingerents 
as it was previously done, but also the result caused by the war plays a part 
as equivalent criterion.12 (In the first place, their offect on the universal 
peace shall be taken into consideration but as another important element, 
also the social consequences not only of the after-war state but also of the 
war shall be reckoned with, as for the personal and material losses, the 
moral moments also included.)
In the present world situation, some of the so-called “local wars” 
carries in itself 'potentially the risk of the world war since it is mostly unfore­
seeable how the “escalation” of the given war will take place due to the 
fundamental conflicting interests. In addition, it occurs frequently today 
in the local wars that both parties get assistance, therefore the wars of 
liberation are extremely drawn out and demand innumerable victims (see 
e.g. the war in Viet-Nam). The destructive effect is intensified by that the 
traditional military engineering has developed by leaps in the recent one 
and a half decades and due to the external assistance, the results of this 
military engineering can be used almost uncontrolled by the belligerents. 
Therefore, even in case when the pre-war state shows the picture of a highly 
unjust, moreover, historically outdated society — e.g. in case of an intense 
colonial enslavement — the question, whether the unleashing of a war is 
just or not, cannot be answered as unambiguously as previosuly on the 
principle that the war is just because it aims at the establishment of juster 
social conditions as compared to the former ones. I t  cannot be considered 
a mere chance that the socialist countries advocate the passible peaceful 
settlement even of conflicts of such character.
With the valuation of such w7ars the fact shall be taken into consi­
deration that fundamental contradictions exist between the justness and the 
war according to the above outlined conception. While namely the justness 
means the liberty of people, the putting forth of their abilities and their 
ideas, the comprehensive enforcement — within certain bounds — of then- 
volition, the war, on the contrary, represents the violance, the destruction, 
the working of the will of some people upon the others. Therefore, the 
peace is the precondition, the concomitant of the justness.
Consequently, even a local war aiming at the establishment of juster 
social conditions, involving, however, also unjust moments, cannot be 
unambiguously just. Not in the sense as written by Lenin that “no clear 
phenomena” exist in the nature and in the society and, thus, neither this 
war is like that. Such rear is a profoundly contradictory phenomenon with 
a view to the justness. The war of such type is full of value-destroying 
moments when it declares such unmoral conducts as values as the destruction 
of human and metarial properties whereby a shifting of values occurs which
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renders for a long time difficult the enforcement of moral values, among 
them of the justness, still after the conclusion of peace. The just wars 
produce also inevitably the mass perdition of innocent people: both of 
armed and unarmed onas. (Although these marks are to a certain extent 
characteristic of all wars, they gathered, however, strength in the recent 
years, e.g. because the outlines between the belligerents and the civilian 
population get blurred by the modern war.)
Summing up: the historically evolved close connection between the 
justness and the peace as values becomes in the 20th century, and especially 
in the second half thereof, more and more evident according to the tendency 
of the historical development. One of its most suggestive mark is that the 
former valuation sharply distinguishing between the just war and the unjust 
one, must be replaced by a more differentiated analysis judging the whole 
question primarily in the perspective of the universal peace and of the world 
war.
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law fu rther developed by V ittoria and Suarez as th e  basis of the  judgement, of war conflicts. 
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JUSTICE, PEACE, WAR 
TAMÁS FÖLDEST
In  his study  th e  au thor tries to  apply the conception elaborated in his book on justice
I o the problems of war and peace. In the course of a historical analysis he examines th e  evolu­
tion of the  conception of a ju s t war in philosophy and international law. He comes to  th e  con­
clusion th a t th e  m arxist concept ion of a ju s t war must lie revised for in th e  shadow of a 3rd 
world war threaten ing  the survival o f m ankind the criteria  of a  ju s t w ar m ust be changed 
and it is doubtful w hether th is conception can be used in th e  future.
JUSTICE, PAIX, GUERRE
Dans son étude, 1 au teu r essaie d ’appliquer la conception élaborée dans son livre sur la 
justice aux problèmes de la guerre et de la paix. Au cours d ’une analyse historique il examine 
l’évolution de la conception d ’une guerre juste  dans la philosophie e t le droit international.
II en v ien t à la  conclusion que la conception m arxiste d ’une guerre juste doit être révisée 
car à  l’ombre d ’une troisième guerre mondiale m enaçant l’existence de l ’hum anité les critères 
d une guerre juste  doivent être changés e t il est contestable que cette conception puisse môme 
être utilisée à l’avenir.
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